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Abstract
This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital require-
ments contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk
taking in the nancial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard cre-
ated by government guarantees rather than from corporate governance failures
within banks. The idea of the proposed regulation is to utilize the compensation
scheme to drive a wedge between the interests of top management and sharehold-
ers to counteract shareholder risk-shifting incentives. The decisive advantage of
this approach compared to existing regulation is that the regulator does not need
to be able to properly measure the bank investment risk, which has been shown
to be a dicult task during the 2008-2009 nancial crisis.
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In response to the 2008-2009 nancial crisis that exposed the excessive risk-
taking of banks, legislators seek to curb risk-taking incentives in the nancial
sector. Since the compensation schemes of bank managers can often be directly
linked to the risky investment behavior of many nancial institutions (e.g., Bear
Stearns, Lehman, UBS, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, and AIG)1, it has been argued
that corporate governance failures within banks were a primary cause of the
nancial crisis. Following this line of argument, aligning executive pay arrange-
ments with the interests of banks' shareholders may limit excessive risk-taking.
However, shareholders of nancial institutions may have strong risk-shifting
incentives due to the presence of explicit and implicit government guarantees.
Hence, shareholder empowerment aggravates the excessive risk problem, since
shareholders will just pass on their risk-shifting incentives to bank managers.
The regulatory solution to this problem has so far been the implementation of
risk-weighted capital requirements. In this paper, we propose a new regulatory
approach that involves capital requirements that are contingent on managerial
compensation. This approach utilizes the compensation scheme to drive a wedge
between the interests of top management and shareholders, counteracting share-
holder risk-shifting incentives.
Risk-shifting incentives have been intensively studied since the seminal work
of Jensen and Meckling (1976). The classical risk-shifting problem between
debtholders and shareholders arises when debtholders are unable to obtain ade-
quate adjustments of risk premiums in case the investment risk increases. This
problem is particularly relevant for banks due to their high leverage and the fact
that they can relatively easy change the degree of risk of their business activ-
ities. This risk-shifting problem can be mitigated to some extent by including
loan covenants in the debt contract (e.g., Berlin and Mester (1992) and Chava
and Roberts (2008)) or using short-term debt (Chava and Roberts (2008)).
However, for nancial institutions an even more severe risk-shifting problem
arises when governments implicitly or explicitly guarantee part of the banks'
deposits or borrowed funds. These guarantees limit the downside risk of debt
and in turn increase the expected repayment to debtholders. Therefore, insured
debtholders have no incentive to adjust capital costs appropriately for risk. Thus,
banks are incentivized to increase the amount of insured debt as much as pos-
sible, since it is comparatively inexpensive. The resulting high leverage in turn
incentivizes banks to invest in risky assets, since the capital costs of insured debt
are not risk adjusted. Ultimately, this risky behavior leads to a correspondingly
high default probability. While equityholders do not bear the expected costs of
1For details see Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008), Acharya and Richardson (2009), and
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010).
2a bank failure in the form of a higher cost of debt funding ex ante, taxpayers
have to bear all the costs of bank failures ex post. Wealth is thereby transferred
from society to equityholders.
This issue justies regulatory intervention, which so far has been the imple-
mentation of risk-weighted capital requirements. However, the 2008-2009 nan-
cial crisis revealed that measuring bank risk is a dicult task, since risk modeling
per se has strong limits (e.g., Danielsson (2002) and Danielsson (2008)). Further-
more, after the implementation of regulatory measures, shareholders still have an
incentive to circumvent the regulations by putting compensation schemes in place
that reinforce the attractiveness of regulatory arbitrage. For this reason Bebchuk
and Spamann (2010) advocate that monitoring compensation structures should
play an important role in determining the appropriate capital requirements spe-
cic to each nancial institution. The authors argue that this approach improves
the overall eectiveness of banking regulation, since information about pay struc-
tures can be used to produce a better t between capital requirements and the
investment risks posed by individual banks.
Inspired by this idea, we present a model that theoretically justies this ap-
proach. In particular, we show how the excessive risk-taking problem, given ex-
plicit or implicit guarantees, can be solved by a regulatory approach that makes
the capital requirements of banks contingent on the compensation schemes of
management. This regulatory measure works as follows: The more the compen-
sation structure decouples bank managers' interests from those of shareholders
by curbing risk-taking incentives, the higher the amount of insured debt a bank is
permitted to take on. In this case, the risk-taking incentives arising from insured
debt and the risk-mitigating incentives created by the compensation structure
oset each other, such that the manager chooses the socially optimal risk level.
This approach has several advantages over existing regulation. First, the reg-
ulator does not need to be able to properly measure the bank investment risk,
as in the case of risk-weighted capital requirements such as the Basel Accords.
Relying on banks reporting their own risks is also not an eective solution, since
banks anticipate that reporting high investment risks leads to higher levels of
required equity capital, which gives them an incentive to understate their risk
levels. Instead of relying on banks' risk reporting, the proposed regulatory ap-
proach uses the observable compensation scheme to draw conclusions about bank
risks. Furthermore, compared to corporate governance measures that regulate
bank managers remuneration, the proposed approach does not involve direct
regulation of the compensation schemes and hence does not restrict contractual
freedom between shareholders and managers. Instead, it only takes the com-
pensation schemes into account when determining a bank's individual capital
requirements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an
overview of the related literature. Section 3 presents the model setup. In Sec-
3tion 4 we rst determine the capital structure and investment decisions of banks
when they are not regulated. Section 5 then analyzes the eects of regulatory
approaches that do not incorporate the compensation scheme of the manage-
ment. In Section 6 we propose the new regulatory approach that makes capital
regulation contingent on the compensation structure. Section 7 discusses policy
implications and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Related Literature
The question of how bank CEO contracts can be designed to establish opti-
mal investment risk decisions has gained increasing attention during and in the
aftermath of the 2008-09 nancial crisis. Early work by John and John (1993),
conceptually the most related paper to ours, determines optimal compensation
rules given a specic exogenously given leverage. Our approach proposes a regu-
latory mechanism that works vice versa, that is, the allowed leverage depends on
the compensation scheme. This mechanism has several implementation-related
advantages, discussed in Section 6.
The theoretical analysis provided by John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000) pro-
poses a regulatory approach in which the deposit insurance premium scheme
incorporates incentive features of top management compensation. A problem
with this approach is that insurance premiums do not cover implicit insured
debt and thus risk-shifting incentives are still prevalent. Edmans and Liu (2011)
show that a compensation scheme that is also based on debt components can
improve eort as well as deter risk-shifting. However, as described before, public
guarantees distort the value of debt. Therefore, using this approach, bank man-
agers may still have an incentive to increase bank systemic risk to maximize the
value of implicit government guarantees.
A very recent paper by Bolton, Mehran, and Shapiro (2010) proposes the
inclusion of CDS spreads in the compensation scheme to mitigate the risk-shifting
problem. However, CDS spreads do also not re
ect the actual investment risks
of banks, since the spreads also incorporate the government guarantees and thus
tend to be too low. Thanassoulis (2012) and Hakenes and Schnabel (2012)
develop theoretical arguments for caps on bankers' bonuses.
Various papers empirically investigate the relation between shareholder power,
CEO compensation, insured debt, and banks' risk-taking decisions. Chesney,
Stromberg, and Wagner (2010) nd evidence suggesting that higher risk-taking
incentives for managers of U.S. nancial institutions were signicantly positively
associated with write-downs during the crisis. Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman
(2010) also show that there is a correlation between compensation structures
and risk-taking. Furthermore, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) nd evidence that
banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with shareholder inter-
ests performed worse during the crisis, on average. Laeven and Levine (2009)
4show that great shareholder power within a bank's corporate governance struc-
ture translates into the bank's higher risk taking. Furthermore, the authors
show that an increase in shareholder power is associated with a rise in risk in
response to tougher regulation and more access to deposit insurance. Westman
(2010) conrms these results. The empirical study by Gropp and Koehler (2010)
nds that shareholder-controlled banks behave in a riskier fashion and obtain
more government assistance than manager-controlled banks. Taken together,
empirical evidence also suggests that deposit insurance schemes induce exces-
sive risk-taking by banks and that alignment of the interests of shareholders and
managers is thus not socially optimal.
3. Model setup
To study the risk-shifting incentives of bank shareholders and bank managers,
we follow the model of John and John (1993). To apply the model to the nancial
sector, we have to extend it by endogenizing capital structure choice. Therefore,
we use the model of Inderst and Mueller (2008), since it coincides with empirical
ndings and enables us to also incorporate the risk-shifting problem.2
External claims are issued
t = 0
Manager observes investment risk
Manager decides on investment
t = 1
Cash 
ows are realized
t = 2
Figure 1: Timing of the model
We consider an economy that consists of three dates, t = 0;1;2, and four
parties: a bank, its shareholders and creditors, and the bank manager. All parties
are risk neutral and the shareholders have all the bargaining power. The bank
has access to two investment possibilities, a risky investment opportunity and a
safe one. Both investments require a xed capital outlay of k. The bank manager
decides on the bank's investments as well as its capital structure and acts on his
own behalf, given the incentive contracts in place. For the incentive contract
we consider the common compensation scheme consisting of a xed wage and a
performance-based component, that depends on the return on equity achieved.
2Several empirical studies nd that banks often hold equity in excess of the minimum
regulatory requirement (e.g., Flannery and Rangan (2008)) and that changes in banks' capital
structure are not related to changes in regulatory requirements (e.g., Gropp and Heider (2010)).
Hence, it seems that the optimal leverage of banks is simply too low for the minimum capital
requirements to be binding. The theories of Diamond and Rajan (2000), Inderst and Mueller
(2008), and Allen, Carletti, and Marquez (2011) are consistent with non-binding minimum
capital requirements and stable leverage over time. However, only the model of Inderst and
Mueller (2008) enables incorporation of the risk-shifting problem.
5This type of contract is closely related to remuneration schemes observed in
practice. The timing of our model is depicted in Figure 1.
At t = 0 the external claims are issued and investors demand an appropriate
risk premium. We assume that bank liabilities are at least partially protected
by public guarantees, which include deposit insurance and the expectations of
bailouts for systemically important institutions. However, our model acknowl-
edges that public guarantees do not extend fully to all of the bank's debt. There-
fore, we assume that the bank can raise insured debt only up to a certain limit
di < k, which prevents the bank from nancing its investments solely with in-
sured debt. This upper limit of insured debt di is increasing in the amount of
insured deposits (insured through a deposit guarantee scheme) the bank has ac-
cess to, as well as in the level of systemic risk that emanates from the bank.
The latter increases the amount of insured debt, because systemic risk enhances
the implicit debt guarantee given by a possible government bailout. Hence, the
sources of capital that are explicitly studied are equity (e) provided by the share-
holders and debt in the form of explicit and implicit insured debt (di) as well
as non-insured debt (dn), yielding total funds of K := e + di + dn. Since all of
the bank's investment opportunities require a capital outlay k, we specify that
K = k.
We assume that all investors have the opportunity cost of capital r. Since
insured creditors are not demanding a risk premium, the interest rate of insured
debt is equal to the opportunity cost of capital r. However, the cost for equity
and non-insured debt fully re
ects the ex-ante riskiness of the funds. Therefore,
neither form of nancing is intrinsically cheaper. All debt claims mature at t = 2
and the bank promises non-insured debtholders to repay the principal dn and the
interest dnrD whenever possible.
The bank's investments possibilities materialize at t = 1. The success prob-
ability of the risky investment opportunity depends on the investment's quality,
which is given by s 2 S = [0;1]. With probability s, the risky investment gen-
erates a positive return of RH and with probability (1   s) the risky investment
fails. In the latter case the bank defaults on its debt, if di + dn(1 + rD) > 0.
However, in the course of bankruptcy proceedings, the risky investment oppor-
tunity yields a liquidation value of  (with  + di < k), which can be seized by
the non-insured creditors. Therefore,  is a measure of the downside risk of the
risky investment opportunity.
Instead of investing in the risky investment, the bank can choose a safe in-
vestment opportunity that always yields the risk-free return RL, with RH >
RL > k(1 + r). Before deciding between the two investment possibilities, the
manager learns the quality of the risky investment opportunity, s, through a
screening procedure. The manager then decides between the risky and riskless
investments based on the manager's private observation of s at t = 1. Since the
quality of the investment is the manager's private information, it is not possible
6to write a contract contingent on the investment quality s. However, all the
relevant parties know that s is distributed uniformly over the interval [0;1].
At t = 2 the cash 
ows from the investment made at t = 1 are realized. The
possible and veriable cash 
ow realizations are (i) y = RL if the bank invested
in the safe investment, (ii) y = RH if the bank chose the risky investment and
was a success, and (iii) y =  if the risky investment was chosen, went bad, and
was liquidated during bankruptcy proceedings.
First, we start by determining the rst-best investment decision from a so-
cial welfare perspective. This rst-best decision is then the reference point for
the following analyses. Therefore, we have to determine the range of investment
quality s for which the risky investment has a higher expected return than the
safe investment and should thus be selected over the safe investment opportu-
nity. Thus, it is rst-best ecient to invest in the risky investment opportunity
whenever s  sFB and to reject it if s < sFB, where sFB is the investment quality
at which the two investments have the same expected return:
sFBRH + (1   sFB) = RL , sFB =
RL   
RH   
(1)
As John and John (1993), we dene an investment policy of investing in the risky
investment opportunity for all s  e s as investment policy e s. As expected, the
critical threshold sFB depends positively on the return of the safe asset RL and
negatively on the upside potential of the risky investment opportunity RH and
its downside risk .
4. Capital structure and investment decisions without regulation
In this section, the capital structure and bank managers's investment choice
are characterized for the case where the government does not introduce any
regulation. In this case the shareholders align the manager's incentives with
their own by paying the manager only a performance-based wage that depends
on the return on equity achieved. Hence, we can treat the manager as an owner
manager (e.g., the manager owns the bank).
As described, concerning the capital structure decision at t = 0, the owner
manager (or bank hereafter, for simplicity) can choose between three dierent
forms of funding: equity e, insured debt di  di, and non-insured debt dn. Re-
garding the investment decision at t = 1, the bank can choose between a safe
investment and a risky one. If the bank invests in the safe asset, the correspond-
ing payo to the shareholders equals RL di dn (1 + rD), where we assume that
the return of the safe investment is always high enough to enable the bank to
settle its liabilities. If the bank invests in the risky investment and it turns out
to be a failure, the payo is zero, since the bank defaults and outside creditors
seize the liquidation value of the investment. Lastly, in case the bank decides to
7invest in the risky investment and it is a success, the payo to the shareholders
is RH  di dn (1 + rD). We solve the bank's optimization problem by backward
induction. Thus, we rst determine the privately optimal investment policy at
t = 1 and then solve for the optimal capital structure at t = 0. Regarding the
investment decision at t = 1, the bank optimally invests in the risky investment
opportunity whenever s  s, where 0 < s < 1 solves
s
 [RH   di   dn (1 + rD)] = RL   di   dn (1 + rD)
) s
 =
RL   di   dn (1 + rD)
RH   di   dn (1 + rD)
(2)
From (2), we can infer that the investment policy s decreases as the amount of
debt increases, since the derivative of s with respect to the face value of debt is
negative:
@s
@(di + dn (1 + rD))
=  
RH   RL
(RH   di   dn (1 + rD))
2 < 0
Hence, if the face value of debt increases, the investment policy becomes riskier
since it is likelier that the bank will choose the risky investment opportunity. On
account of this fact, the investment decision at t = 1 is in
uenced by the capital
structure decision at t = 0.
Therefore, at t = 0 the bank chooses the capital mix that maximizes the
expected return on equity, taking into account the impact on the investment
policy at t = 1. Since the quality s of the risky investment opportunity is
distributed uniformly over the interval [0;1], the expected value of equity at
t = 0 is given by
VE := (1   s
)
1
2
+
1
2
s


[RH   di   dn (1 + rD)]
+ s
 [RL   di   dn (1 + rD)] (3)
where the rst term represents the cash 
ow to the shareholders in case the
risky investment was chosen and was successful and the second term represents
the cash 
ow for the case where the bank invested in the safe asset. To attract
non-insured debt from creditors, rD must satisfy their participation constraint,
which is the case if their expected repayment, VD, satises
VD := (1   s
)
1
2
+
1
2
s


dn (1 + rD) + (1   s
)
1
2
 
1
2
s



+ s
dn (1 + rD)  dn(1 + r) (4)
where again the rst two terms give the value of the non-insured debt claim in
case the risky investment was chosen, successfully or not, and the third term
8states the claims of the uninsured creditors in the case of investment in the safe
asset. By optimality, this constraint binds, since the bank has the bargaining
power and it could otherwise extract more prots by lowering rD. By substituting
the binding constraint (4) into (3), we obtain the following for the expected return
on equity at t = 0:
VE   e(1 + r) = (1   s
)
1
2
+
1
2
s


[RH   di] + (1   s
)
1
2
 
1
2
s



+ s
 [RL   di] + [di   k](1 + r) (5)
where we used also that e + di + dn = k. The objective of the bank at t = 0
is now to maximize (5) by choosing an optimal capital structure. From (5) it
can directly be inferred that the bank takes on as much insured debt as possible,
since the derivative of (5) with respect to di is positive:
@VE   e(1 + r)
@di
=
1
2
(1   s
)
2 + r > 0
Therefore, the bank always chooses d
i = di, since insured debt is cheaper than
the other two funding sources. Since equity and non-insured debt fully re
ect
the ex-ante riskiness of the funds, the nancing costs are the same and, in regard
to the cost of capital, the bank would be indierent between the two funding
sources. This indierence can also be seen from (5), since the expected return
on equity does not depend on the amount of non-insured debt. However, as
described before, substituting non-insured debt for equity alters the investment
policy at t = 1, which in turn changes the expected value of equity. Therefore,
the bank can use the capital structure decision at t = 0 to maximize the expected
return on equity by committing to, through the capital structure choice at t = 0,
the privately optimal investment policy at t = 1. Therefore, we rst derive
the ex-ante privately optimal investment policy and then determine the capital
structure required to commit to this policy. For the ex-ante optimal investment
policy s, optimizing the expected return on equity from (5) with respect to the
investment policy at t = 1 yields:
@VE   e(1 + r)
@s
! = 0 ) s
 =
RL      di
RH      di
< sFB (6)
where we already inserted the optimal amount of insured debt d
i = di. Since we
made sure that RL >  + d holds for the return of the safe asset, s will be an
interior solution. The threshold s in equation (6) is decreasing in the amount
of insured debt, since the derivative of s with respect to di is negative:
@s
@di
=  
RH   RL
(RH      di)2 < 0
9Therefore, the desired investment policy becomes riskier if the amount of insured
debt increases. A comparison of expressions (1) and (6) directly shows that the
bank wants to commit itself to a riskier investment policy than the rst-best one.
This behavior then leads to the classical risk-shifting problem. The shareholders
do not have to bear the expected costs of bank failure in the form of higher costs
of debt funding ex-ante due to public guarantees. Therefore, they are incentivized
to take on as much insured debt as possible and to make riskier investments than
are socially optimal. Since the taxpayers have to bear all the costs of a bank
failure ex-post, wealth is transferred from society to the shareholders.
To commit to the privately optimal investment policy desired, the bank
chooses a face value of non-insured debt such that s from (2) and s from
(6) coincide. For the optimal face value of non-insured debt, setting (6) equal to
(2) and rearranging yields:
d

n (1 + r

D) = 
Therefore, the amount of non-insured debt that is required to commit to the
privately optimal investment policy coincides with the downside risk  of the
risky investment. Hence, the total amount of debt chosen by the bank is
d

i + d

n (1 + r

D) = di + 
These results yield the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. If the government does not introduce any regulation, the bank
chooses a capital structure at t = 0 such that it commits to the investment policy
s
 =
RL      di
RH      di
< sFB
which leads to a risk-shifting problem, since the chosen investment policy is
riskier than the rst-best investment policy and wealth is transferred from so-
ciety to the shareholders.
5. Regulation without considering the compensation scheme
In this section we determine and analyze possible regulatory responses to the
risk-shifting problem described in the previous section. However, in this section
we rst only consider regulatory approaches that do not regulate the compensa-
tion schemes or take them into account in any way. The objective of the regulator
is to implement the rst-best investment policy given in (1) to prevent a wealth
transfer from taxpayers to shareholders. To do so, the regulator can introduce
a regulatory scheme at t = 0 before the external claims are issued, which is
common knowledge in the market. In particular, we analyze the regulatory ap-
proaches of banning insured debt, introducing a deposit insurance premium, and
implementing capital requirements.
105.1. Banning insured debt
From the optimal desired investment policy s, given by (6), it follows that
banning insured deposits, as well as committing to a no-bailout policy and
thereby eliminating implicit guarantees, would induce the bank to commit to
s = sFB at t = 0 by choosing d
n (1 + r
D) = . However, it is not reason-
able to generally ban insured debt due to the possibility of classical bank runs
and/or interbank market disruptions (e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983); Blan-
chard (2009)).
5.2. Deposit insurance premium
Another way the regulator can implement the rst-best investment incentives
at t = 0 is to introduce a deposit insurance premium that the bank has to pay
when it takes on insured debt. This premium has to be increasing in the riskiness
of the bank's investment policy, as well as in the amount of the bank's insured
debt, such that it osets the risk-shifting incentives that arise through taking on
insured debt. Hence, the appropriate deposit insurance premium that has to be
imposed on the bank at t = 0 is given by
 =
1
2
(s
)
2   s


di (7)
This result can be veried by subtracting the fee  from the expected return on
equity given in (5), which yields
VE   e(1 + r) = (1   s
)
1
2
+
1
2
s


[RH   di] + (1   s
)
1
2
 
1
2
s



+ s
 [RL   di] + [di   k](1 + r)  
1
2
(s
)
2   s


di (8)
Optimizing (8) with respect to the investment policy at t = 1, s, yields the new
desired investment policy at t = 0 in the case the bank has to pay an additional
deposit insurance premium :
@VE   e(1 + r)
@s
! = 0 ) s
 =
RL   
RH   
(9)
which, in fact, coincides with the rst-best investment policy sFB. However,
since the appropriate deposit insurance premium  depends on s as well as
the amount of insured debt, the regulator must be able to observe and measure
additional investment- and bank-specic properties. The most critical properties
are obviously the upside potential of the risky investment, RH, as well as the
maximal available amount of insured debt di. To quantify these parameters,
the regulator must be able to evaluate the risks of the bank's investments, as
well as measure the systemic risks that emanate from the bank and in turn
11the bailout probabilities associated therewith. However, the 2008-2009 nancial
crisis revealed that risk modeling in the nancial sector has strong limits (e.g.,
Danielsson (2002); Danielsson (2008)). Hence, such a regulatory approach is
hardly able to achieve the objectives of the regulator eciently.
5.3. Capital requirements
Furthermore, a regulator could also force the bank to choose the rst-best
investment policy without banning insured debt or introducing a deposit insur-
ance premium. Therefore, the regulator has to introduce capital requirements
that set the total level of debt (i.e., insured and uninsured) such that the bank
establishes the rst-best investment policy at t = 1 (s  sFB). This regulation
prevents the bank from committing to the desired investment policy s, which is
riskier than the rst-best investment policy, through the capital structure choice.
Setting the investment policy s from (2) equal to the rst-best given in (1) and
solving for the face value of debt yields:
di + dn(1 + rD) =  (10)
Therefore, the maximal permitted leverage level depends on the downside risk of
the investment, as in the Basel Accords. If the regulator prohibits the bank to
take on more debt than , the bank manager will choose the rst-best investment
policy at t = 1. This regulation translates into the following minimum equity
capital requirements:
e = k   [di + dn(1 + rD)] = k    (11)
As can be seen from (11), when using the classical capital regulation approach,
such as the Basel Accords, the regulator needs to be able to observe the downside
risk of the investments to establish the rst-best investment policy. Therefore,
this regulation is also hardly able to work eectively due to the above-mentioned
limits of risk modeling in the nancial sector.
Hence, we can conclude that all regulatory approaches that do not take into
account management's compensation scheme have major drawbacks. Banning
insured debt risks triggering bank runs and/or interbank market disruptions.
To eectively introduce deposit insurance fees and/or capital regulation, the
regulator must be able to observe and measure investment and bank specic
properties, which is dicult.
6. Capital regulation contingent on the compensation structure
In this section, we show that a regulatory approach that makes capital re-
quirements contingent on management's compensation scheme is able to avert the
risk-shifting problem and to implement the rst-best investment policy without
12requiring the regulator to measure the bank investment risk. We again con-
sider but now also formalize the standard compensation structure, consisting of
a xed wage S, which is paid in all states in which the bank is solvent, and
a performance-based component. The latter is the fraction  of the expected
return on equity. Hence, the expected compensation for the manager becomes
VM := E[S] + [VE   e(1 + r)]  0 (12)
The manager can still choose between the three dierent forms of funding and
two dierent investment opportunities. We solve the manager's optimization
problem by backward induction. Therefore, the manager decides to invest in
the risky investment opportunity at t = 1 whenever the success probability s is
greater or equal to s
M, where s
M solves
s

M [S + [RH   di   dn (1 + rD)   S]] = S + [RL   di   dn (1 + rD)   S]
) s

M =
(1   )S + [RL   di   dn (1 + rD)]
(1   )S + [RH   di   dn (1 + rD)]
(13)
The left-hand side of the equation represents the expected wage payment in
case the manager chooses the risky investment and the right-hand side is the
remuneration in case the safe investment is chosen. In the event of the risky in-
vestment's failure, it is assumed that the xed wage is subordinated (i.e., junior)
to debtholder claims in the bankruptcy procedure, as in Dewatripont and Tirole
(1994) and Hart and Moore (1995). As shown in (13), the investment decision
at t = 1 is still in
uenced by the capital structure decision at t = 0 and, in
addition, this decision is now aected by the compensation structure.
Next, we consider the manager's capital structure decision at t = 0. Since
the manager chooses the capital mix that maximizes his expected compensation
in (12), we rst have to determine the expected return on equity again. Hence,
after incorporating the manager's xed wage payment, the expected value of
equity becomes
VE := (1   s

M)
1
2
+
1
2
s

M

[RH   di   dn (1 + rD)   S]
+ s

M [RL   di   dn (1 + rD)   S] (14)
The participation constraint of the non-insured creditor is the same as in (4)
when accounting for the new critical investment threshold s
M:
VD := (1   s

M)
1
2
+
1
2
s

M

dn (1 + rD) + (1   s

M)
1
2
 
1
2
s

M


+ s

Mdn (1 + rD)  dn(1 + r) (15)
Again we need to plug the binding constraint (15) into (14), which now yields
for the expected return on equity, after rearranging,
VE   e(1 + r) = (1   s

M)
1
2
+
1
2
s

M

[RH   di   S]
13+ (1   s

M)
1
2
 
1
2
s

M


+ s

M [RL   di   S] + [di   k](1 + r) (16)
Plugging the expected return on equity from (16) into (12) yields for the expected
payment to the manager at t = 0:
VM = (1   s

M)
1
2
+
1
2
s

M

[(1   )S + RH   di]
+ (1   s

M)
1
2
 
1
2
s

M


+ s

M [(1   )S + RL   di] + [di   k](1 + r) (17)
The manager's objective at t = 0 is now to maximize (17) by choosing a pri-
vately optimal capital structure. From (17) one can again directly infer that the
manager takes on as much insured debt as possible, since the derivative of (17)
with respect to di is again positive:
@VM
@di
=
1
2
(1   s

M) + r > 0
Furthermore, as can be seen from (17), substituting non-insured debt for equity
still does not alter the expected payment directly. However, it still in
uences the
investment policy at t = 1 given in (13), which in turn changes the manager's
expected payment. Thus, we rst determine the investment policy the manager
would like to commit to at t = 0 and then the amount of non-insured debt
required to commit to this privately optimal investment policy. The rst-order
condition of (17) with respect to s
M yields
@VM
@s
M
! = 0 ) s

M =
(1   )S + (RL   di   )
(1   )S + (RH   di   )
(18)
To commit to the privately optimal investment policy desired, the manager now
chooses a face value of non-insured debt such that s
M from (13) and s
M from
(18) coincide.
Hence, the regulator is able to implement the rst-best investment policy if
he ensures that the desired investment policy given in (18) equals the rst-best
investment policy from (1). In this case, the manager will choose the face value
of non-insured debt, committing himself to the rst-best investment policy. The
idea of the new regulatory approach proposed in this paper is that the manager's
compensation scheme can be used by the regulator to implement the rst-best
investment policy by making capital requirements contingent on the remunera-
tion structure. Equation (18) shows that an increase in the performance-based
wage component  leads to a decrease in s
M:
@s
M
@
=  S
RH   RL
((1   )S + (RH   di   ))2 < 0
14Hence, higher performance-based remuneration incentivizes the manager to choose
a riskier investment policy. On the other hand, raising the xed wage S increases
s
M and thus reduces the manager's risk-shifting incentives so that the manager
chooses a less risky investment policy:
@s
M
@S
= (1   )
RH   RL
((1   )S + (RH   di   ))2 > 0
Therefore, the regulator has to make sure that the risk-shifting incentives created
by the availability of insured debt are oset by an appropriate ratio between xed
and performance-based remuneration components. This optimal relation can be
determined by setting s
M = sFB and solving for the face value of insured debt,
which yields the following regulatory requirement:
d
r
i =
(1   )

S (19)
where the compulsory level of insured debt dr
i increases in the xed wage S
and decreases in the performance-based component . After plugging in the
regulatory requirement from (19), the objective function of the manager at t = 0
reduces to
VM := (1   s

M)
1
2
+
1
2
s

M

[RH] + (1   s

M)
1
2
 
1
2
s

M


+ s

M [RL] + [
(1   )

S   k](1 + r) (20)
Deriving the new rst-order condition of (20) with respect to s
M veries that the
newly proposed regulatory approach is in fact able to implement the rst-best
investment incentives:
@VM
@s
M
! = 0 ) s

M =
(RL   )
(RH   )
= sFB (21)
Hence, the regulator has to ensure via mandatory capital requirements that the
level of insured debt does not exceed the level determined in equation (19).
A special feature of this regulatory approach is the fact that the regulator no
longer needs to be able to measure the bank investment risk to implement the
rst-best investment policy. Therefore, the need to monitor the adequacy of risk
assessments for the assets of nancial institutions is greatly reduced. Instead, the
regulator only needs to gather information about the manager's compensation
structure, which is much easier to do. This information can then be used to draw
conclusions about bank risk.
Given this kind of capital regulation, the manager maximizes the amount of
insured debt until the capital requirements bind and thus chooses d
i = dr
i =
15(1 )
 S. The manager then tries to commit to the rst-best investment policy at
t = 0 by choosing the appropriate amount of non-insured debt. Now, we have to
check whether the manager can do so, because this commitment is only possible if
the investment policy at t = 1 is still in
uenced by the capital structure decision
at t = 0, given the new regulatory requirements. Plugging (19) into (13) yields
the investment policy of the manager at t = 1, given the regulation policy from
(19):
s

M =
RL   dn (1 + rD)
RH   dn (1 + rD)
(22)
It is crucial to observe that the investment decision at t = 1 can still be in
uenced
by the capital structure decision at t = 0, due to the presence of the face value
of debt on the right-hand side of (22). Setting s
M from (22) equal to sFB from
(1) and solving for dn (1 + rD) yields the amount of non-insured debt that the
manager chooses at t = 0 under this regulatory regime:
d

n (1 + r

D) = 
Thus for the total amount of debt we obtain
d

i + d

n (1 + r

D) =
(1   )

S + 
These results yield the following proposition.
Proposition 6.1. The implementation of capital requirements contingent on the
xed and performance-based compensation components induces the manager to
choose the rst-best investment policy. Furthermore, using this kind of regulation,
the regulator does not need to be able to measure the bank investment risk.
With the regulatory scheme from (19) in place, shareholders can alter the permit-
ted level of insured debt by setting the compensation components accordingly.
Hence, this regulatory approach allows all kinds of business models. Shareholders
can adjust the wage components in such a way that the bank is allowed to take
on its maximum available amount of insured debt di. Furthermore, this regula-
tory approach does not regulate the remuneration directly, since banks can still
freely choose how they pay their executives. However, with the new regulation
in place, this decision now alters the bank's capital requirements.
The economic intuition is as follows. Banks that pay their manager very con-
servatively (with a relatively high S and low ) can choose a higher amount of
explicit and/or implicit insured debt. On the other hand, banks that implement
very steep incentives (with relatively low S and high ) can only choose a rather
low level of explicit and implicit insured debt. This result is quite intuitive.
Implementing a conservative compensation structure (low risk on the manage-
rial side) enables a (potentially) riskier debt structure, since the risk-shifting
16incentives induced by high leverage are oset by a remuneration structure that
mitigates risk taking incentives. On the other hand, in case the bank implements
a compensation structure that provides incentives for risky investment behavior,
the bank is forced to choose a low risk capital structure.
In the following, we extend our model by adding the negative external costs
of a bank default on society (denoted by Bs) and analyze the consequences for
our regulatory approach as a robustness check. The negative external costs
of a bank default can be understood as the costs that arise due to distortions
in the interbank market and the consequences for the real economy associated
therewith. Without regulation, the negative externalities of a bank default widen
the gap between the rst-best investment policy from a social welfare perspective
and the bank's desired risky investment policy. Incorporating these welfare costs
of a bank default, the new rst-best optimal investment policy becomes
sFB(RH + (1   sFB)   (1   sFB)Bs = RL
) sFB =
RL    + Bs
RH    + Bs
(23)
In case the risky investment is chosen and fails, the resulting bank default implies
additional welfare costs Bs. These costs can never arise if the bank invests in the
safe investment at t = 1. Since the social costs of a bank default do not aect the
bank or, in turn, management compensation, the manager does not incorporate
them into the decision. Therefore, the investment policy at t = 1 from (13) and
the desired investment policy at t = 0 from (18) are still the same as before.
Therefore, to incentivize the manager to commit to the rst-best investment
policy at t = 0, the regulator has to ensure that the cut-o level s
M from (18)
equals the rst-best investment policy from (23). Setting s
M = sFB and solving
for the face value of insured debt yields
d
r
i =
(1   )

S   Bs (24)
where the permitted amount of dr
i increases in the xed wage S and decreases in
the performance-based component , as before. In addition, it also decreases in
social bankruptcy costs Bs. This result is very intuitive. In case the social costs
of a bank default are high, the amount of insured debt should be relatively small,
since a high amount of insured debt incentivizes the manager to choose a very
risky investment policy, which in turn increases the bank's default probability.
This regulation scheme is not as easy to implement as before, since the regulator
would also need to know the social costs of a bank default.
7. Discussion and policy implications
Compared to the related approaches of John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000)
and John and John (1993), the regulatory proposal presented in this paper has
17decisive implementation-related advantages. The approach of John and John
(1993) proposes a mandatory compensation structure that depends, among other
factors, on the rm's capital structure. The proposal of John, Saunders, and Sen-
bet (2000) suggests a compensation structure-based rule for setting deposit insur-
ance premiums. However, in both models the debt levels are exogenously given.
Therefore, it is somewhat unclear how incorporating the endogeneity of capital
structure decision would aect these approaches. To implement the approach of
John and John (1993) eectively, the mandatory compensation structure must
be changed as soon as the bank's capital structure is altered. This issue is espe-
cially problematic for nancial institutions, since their capital structure can be
easily altered by the manager on a daily basis. Furthermore, the banks' capital
structure also changes constantly without an actively intervention by managers,
due to price 
uctuations in the banks' assets. This problem is also inherent in
the proposal of John, Saunders, and Senbet (2000), although to a lesser extent.
In case the capital or compensation structure changes, the insurance premiums
must be adjusted. Due to the continual variation of the banks' capital structure,
the insurance premiums would have to be adjusted very frequently, which can
also cause implementation problems. Furthermore, this approach has the draw-
back that deposit insurance premiums do not cover debt that is implicitly insured
through government bailout guarantees. Hence, the risk-shifting problem may
still be prevalent with such a regulation in place.
Capital requirements that are contingent on the compensation structure sig-
nicantly mitigate these implementation problems, since the requirements would
only have to be altered whenever the compensation structure changes. This reg-
ulation is much easier to implement since, in comparison to the continual vari-
ations in banks' capital structure, the compensation structures are altered less
frequently and changes are readily identied. Furthermore, institutional require-
ments such as the so-called "say on pay" rules prohibit frequent changes of the
remuneration scheme. These rules require a shareholder vote to approve the re-
muneration packages of executives. Since bank general meetings are often held
only annually, the compensation structure can not be altered that frequently
with such requirements in place.
Moreover, considering the comprehensive implementation of our regulatory
approach, we must also address the concern of excessive leverage levels. With the
new regulatory approach in place, banks' tendencies to incur excessive risks are
countered, since this regulation is able to eectively eliminate the risk-shifting
problem created by the availability of insured debt. However, banks could be
run with a large balance sheet and very high leverage in case an extremely low
performance-based compensation component is chosen. Then, in case the risk
management of a bank fails, a default of the bank becomes very likely, since there
are no suciently high equity cushions to absorb such risk management errors.
Therefore, in addition to the compensation structure-based capital requirements,
18a safeguard is needed to preclude excessive leverage levels. One possible regula-
tory response to this problem is the imposition of a xed leverage limit, usually
referred to as a leverage ratio, as a complement to the newly proposed approach.
Therefore, banks would have to meet two independent measures of capital ad-
equacy: the capital requirement contingent on the compensation structure to
mitigate the risk-shifting problem and the xed leverage ratio to prohibit the
bank from becoming too highly leveraged. Empirical evidence shows that using
a combination of investment risk-sensitive requirements and a leverage ratio is
very eective (e.g., Estrella, Park, and Peristiani (2000)).
Another implementation issue that needs to be addressed is the scope of the
regulation with respect to the aected nancial institutions and the manage-
ment levels of a bank considered. Since the cause of the risk-shifting problem is
access to public guaranteed debt, the proposed regulatory approach needs only
be applied to the subset of deposit-taking banks, as well as nancial institutions
that are considered systemically important. The other institutions do not need
to be subject to regulation. Regarding the management levels, whose executive
compensation schemes should be included in the regulation, linking the compen-
sation scheme of the bank's top management to the requirements seems to be
sucient. Since the board of directors, especially the CEO, is responsible for
setting the compensation structure and incentives of all other bank employees,
as well as monitoring them, one can assume that top management will pass on
its incentives to its subordinates by either implementing the right compensation
schemes and/or closely monitoring the employees. The eectiveness of focusing
on top management's remuneration structure is also supported by empirical evi-
dence. Ang, Lauterbach, and Schreiber (2002) show that top executives in banks
have very similar compensation structures and pay-performance elasticities, ex-
cept for the CEO. They argue that this pattern is due to the fact that immediate
subordinates are closely monitored by the CEO.
Imposing any kind of regulation on the banking industry always incentivizes
banks to engage in regulatory avoidance behaviors. When the regulator imple-
ments the compensation structure-based capital requirements, banks may re-
spond to the new regulatory approach by remunerating management with im-
plicit forms of compensation, such as benet packages and other perks, instead
of paying their top management with explicit forms of executive compensation.
Hence, the regulator has to make sure that these forms are also covered by regula-
tion. Furthermore, banks have an incentive to disguise performance-based com-
pensation as some kind of xed wage to reimplement risk-shifting incentives for
the manager. A possible solution to this problem is to call for high transparency
with respect to the compensation scheme, for instance, through regulatory ling
requirements, to suciently evaluate the structure. Another way to solve this
problem is to restrict the compensation to several clearly dierentiable types of
remuneration that can be reliably classied as xed or performance-based wage
19payments. Furthermore, banks may respond to the introduction of the proposed
regulatory approach by moving their business operations into the shadow bank-
ing system. However, this problem is inherent in all regulatory measures and
must always be tackled by extending the scope of the regulation accordingly.
Furthermore, the proposed regulatory approach mitigates the problem of
manager self-selection that otherwise aggravates the excessive risk-taking prob-
lem. Dohmen and Falk (2011) show that workers with a low level of risk aversion
are attracted by rms that operate a risky business model and that pay their
employees mainly based on performance instead of remunerating them with xed
payments. With the proposed regulation in place, high-risk banks have to re-
munerate their managers mainly with xed payments, which leaves risk-loving
managers indierent between the dierent types of banks. Critics can also raise
the concern that incorporating pay into the capital regulations will drive away
talent from the nancial sector. However, this regulation is aimed at the com-
pensation structure and not at levels of expected pay. Therefore, even if the
compensation schemes were less attractive to certain managers, banks would be
able to compensate those executives with higher levels of expected pay.
8. Conclusion
Without any regulatory measures, shareholders design the compensation con-
tracts of top management such that it is incentivized to take on excessive risks.
These risk-shifting incentives emerge if public guarantees are granted to bank
depositors and creditors. This issue calls for regulatory intervention. However,
determining the riskiness of bank assets and the corresponding appropriate level
of capital requires intimate knowledge of the banks' asset portfolios, as well as
an extremely sophisticated understanding of risk modeling. This risk assessment
has been shown to be a rather dicult task during the 2008-2009 nancial cri-
sis. We argue that observable incentive features of the managerial compensation
scheme provide valuable information about shareholder objectives, which can
help the regulator reduce the information disadvantages vis--vis bank managers.
Implementing capital requirements conditional on compensation structures can
thus curtail bank incentives for risk shifting and in turn lead to welfare improve-
ments. This approach has the decisive advantage that the regulator does not
need to be able to properly measure investment risk. Instead, the regulator only
needs to be able to observe the compensation structure of top management to
implement rst-best outcomes.
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